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Non-technical summary
The rapid increase in international trade and investment flows over the last two decades is often seen as an important source of efficiency gains and growth. However, it has sometimes been argued that the impressive 5 and 12 percent annual growth of international trade and investment flows since the early 1970s has not contributed to overall world growth, but only benefited a small number of countries. In other words, the argument is that there has been an in-built bias that led to a concentration of trade and investment flows among only a few countries, implying the marginalization of others in world trade and investment. This paper argues that there are no reasons to believe that this is the case, and empirical evidence at the world level tends to show the opposite. The explanation for marginalization of some countries or regions resides in the domestic policies of the affected countries and should not be seen as a natural consequence of rapid increases in international trade.
The assertion that only a few countries have benefited from the rapid increase in trade, while others have been marginalized, looks credible at a first glance. An often quoted example of marginalization in world trade is Sub-Saharan Africa, which accounted for 3.1 percent of world exports in the 1950s and saw its share fall to 1.2 by 1990. More generally, Africa's share of world exports, for example was half its 1985 level in 1996. Similarly, Latin America lost 14 percent of its share during the same period (from 5.6 percent to 4.9 percent), whereas Western Europe increased its share of world trade by 11 percent (from 40.1 to 44.6 percent). Thus, there is a feeling that the increase in international trade has been largely restricted to a handful of countries. Similarly, 85 percent of FDI inflows to developing countries are concentrated in only 10 countries (China alone accounts for 40 percent of FDI inflows to developing countries). This may seem an obvious property, but it is clearly not satisfied when observers argue that the share of Africa's trade in world trade has declined. Second, they are decomposable, which is a desirable property when answering the second question of why some countries have been marginalized. We also allow the indicators to have different degrees of homogeneity on the level of world trade. The idea is to capture the effect that a rapid increase in world trade may have on countries' perceptions of their share of world trade (e.g., a high concentration of international flows may be more burdensome in a world where few international transactions occur). In other words, it may be better to have a small share of a large pie than a larger share of a smaller pie. From these results, we conclude that marginalization of some countries from world markets can be mostly explained by inward-looking domestic policies. Marginalization in world trade is not inherent to the globalization process.
Introduction
International trade and investment flows have increased more rapidly than world GDP over the last two decades.
1
This rapid growth of international transactions has sometimes been referred to as "globalization".
2
Most economists would argue that the rapid increase in international transactions may be seen as a source of efficiency gains and growth 3 , as countries tend to specialize in the production of goods in which they have a comparative advantage.
However, it has sometimes been argued that globalization has not contributed to overall world growth, but only benefited a small number of countries, while many others have failed to reap the benefits of rapid increases in international trade and investment flows. In other words, the globalization process contains an in-built bias that leads to a concentration of trade and investment flows and greater inequality. This paper argues that there are no reasons to believe that globalization may induce marginalization. The explanation for increasing inequality among nations and marginalization resides in the domestic policies of the affected countries.
Section 2 discusses some theoretical and empirical arguments to explain why "Globalization" 
Does globalization cause marginalization?
The assertion that only a few countries have benefited from "globalization", while others have been marginalized, looks credible at first glance. Africa's share of world exports, for example, was half its 1985 level in 1996. Similarly, Latin America has lost 14% of its share during the same period (from 5.6% to 4.9%), whereas Western Europe increased its share of world trade by 11% (from 40.1% to 44.6%).
4
As for FDI, the figures suggest a similar state of affairs: nine developing countries receive 41% of total inflows of FDI to developing countries in 1993 whereas they represent only 17% of total developing countries' GDP, and these figures excludes China which represents 40% of developing countries total inflows. Thus, there is the feeling that "globalization has been largely restricted to a handful of countries".
7
As world trade and investment flows increase, the argument is that these tend to be more concentrated among a few countries. However, the figures given above only give a partial picture of the story. Trade and investment flows have also allowed some developing countries to grow faster. Note that the share of Asian countries in world trade has increased by more than 25% between 1985 and 1996. 8 Also, the share of FDI from developing countries in world FDI more than doubled from 6% in 1985 to 14% in 1996. The aim of this section is to check whether a careful analysis of the evolution of trade and investment flows over the last two decades can confirm the idea that international trade and investment flows are more concentrated than they were two decades or so ago. We calculate different concentration indices across time for world trade and world investment flows for a sample of 144 countries (including both developing and developed countries). It appears that the evidence is mixed, as reported in section 2.2. Section 2.1 describes the different indices that we employed and their properties.
Concentration Indices
In order to evaluate the level of concentration in world trade and investment flows we employed 3 different indicators. Each of these indicators has different properties. The indicators also share, at least, two desirable properties: first, they satisfy the Pigou-Dalton condition which implies that any "transfer" from a country with a high share of world trade to a country with a low share of world trade decreases the level of the concentration index. This may seem an obvious 7 Unido (1996) . 8 WTO (1996). 9 Unctad (1997) and IFC (1997) .
property but neither the Rawls criterion, nor the Quantile analysis, often used to claim that Globalization has only benefited a few countries satisfy this. Second, they are decomposable, which will be a desirable property in section 5 when the sample is decomposed into open and closed economies.
The first concentration index we employed is also the most commonly used indicator of concentration, i.e. the Herfindhal-Hirschman concentration index (H). It is given by:
where f i are trade or investment flows of country i; F are total world trade or investment flows Thus, the weight given to each group depends on the trade share of each group. The Theil entropy coefficient (T) also shares this property and is given by:
The main difference between H and T is that the former is a convex function on the shares of world flows, whereas the latter is a concave function on the shares. This implies that the former is more influenced by changes in the share of large countries whereas the latter is more influenced by changes in the share of small countries. A comparison of the evolution of these two indices may give us some important information on which countries (small or large in terms of trade and investment flows) have experienced changes in their shares. If , for example, T is relatively constant through time, whereas H increases, this implies that the increase in concentration has mainly occurred within the group of countries which have a large share of international flows. Thus, in this sense, the concave property of T may be of particular interest if we are interested in studying the evolution of countries who have a smaller share of international flows.
The main shortcoming of the Herfindhal-Hirschman and the Theil entropy indices from our perspective is that they are sensitive to the number of observations, in the sense that if in period 0 the world is divided into two countries and each has a share of 1/2 in world trade flows, then the index takes the value of 0.5; whereas, if in period 1, the world is divided into 3 countries which each has a 1/3 share of world trade then the index takes the value of 0.33. This may be a desirable property, but it may be misleading in our case, since the number of countries also varies with the availability of data. Thus our last indicator is not sensitive to the number of observations in the sense that regardless of the number of countries in the sample, an equal share for each country does not affect the value of the indicator.
The last indicator is the Mean Logarithm deviation (L) which is given by:
where n is the number of countries. Note that L is a population-weighted indicator which implies that the indicators can be decomposed and the weights given to each group depend on the number of individual (countries) in each group.
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Note that regardless of the number of countries in the sample, when countries have an equal share in world flows, L takes the value of 0.
Non-zero-homogeneous concentration indices
The three concentration indices described above are homogeneous of degree 0 on total flows, or in other words, they are invariant to a change in the scale of the distribution. That is, an increase of 10% of the trade flow of each country leaves the index unaffected. We may also want to look at measure which are not zero-homogeneous, which captures the idea that it may be better to have a small share of a large pie than a larger share of a smaller pie. Or alternatively, that a high concentration of international flows may be more burdensome in a world where few international transactions occur.
Bourguignon (1979) proposes two concentration indicators which are non-homogeneous and that generalize the Mean Logarithm Deviation Index and the Theil entropy coefficient. These are respectively given by L  and T  below:
where f is the average flow across the world in a particular year; and   0 is the degree of homogeneity. If   1, this implies that an increase of 10% in all countries' flows will increase the value taken by the concentration coefficient by 10%. Note that as for L and T, L  and T  are the corresponding population-weighted and flow-weighted decomposable measures of concentration.
Some of the indicators proposed above have different upper and lower bounds; thus, as we are interested in the evolution through time of the level of concentration and not in the level itself, we report the results in respect of each index with a normalized value of 100 in the initial period.
An increase in the value of the normalized concentration index corresponds to higher concentration whereas a fall of the normalized concentration index corresponds to less concentration.
10 See Bourguignon (1979) for a formal proof. we analyze the evolution of the concentration of investment flows.
The Concentration of Flows from 1972 to 1995

The concentration of trade flows
Trade flows for country i are defined as the sum of exports ( x i ) and imports ( m i ) of country i, As previously suggested, comparing the evolution of T and H may be of interest, given that the former is concave on trade shares and the latter convex. Thus, the fact that T is relatively constant through time and H increases by 20% over the period implies that the increase in trade 11
All the regressions on a time trend are done using a Maximum Likelihood iterative technique. 
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To smooth the trends in investment flows, a moving average of these flows is also taken. Data are discussed in the appendix. As with trade concentration, it is useful to compare the evolution of T and H, given that the former is concave on the investment flows shares, whereas the latter is convex. Thus, the fact that T has remained constant, while H has fallen, tends to indicate that the fall in the concentration of investment flows has essentially occurred among countries that had a large share of world flows. This is the mirror image of what has happened with trade flows, as discussed in the previous section.
If the picture looks somewhat ambiguous, the ambiguity disappears when we allow the concentration index to take account of the large increase in world investment flows that has occured (real world investment flows have increased by 794% over the period). As reported in
Figures 6 and 7, the concentration of investment flows falls for any level of homogeneity larger than 0.25 in the concentration indices L  and T  . This is confirmed when regressing these six indicators on a time trend (except for L 0.25 , where the relationship is negative but insignificant).
Insert Here Figures 6 and 7
To summarize, the evolution of the concentration of investment flows is relatively ambiguous and depends on the indicator that is chosen. However, it appears that the level of concentration has fallen among countries that had a large share of world investment flows. Moreover, if we correct the concentration indicators to account for the increase in investment flows at the world level, then the concentration of investment flows has fallen regardless of the concentration measure we use.
Thus, contrary to what has been sometimes suggested, it appears that the increase in world trade and investment flows has not (only) been limited to a few countries. Before drawing more conclusions, we consider whether the marginalization of some countries may be explained by domestic policies. We measure the evolution of the concentration of international flows among two set of countries: rapid and slow integrating economies (i.e. rapidly opening and slowly opening economies) This is done in section 5. First, in section 4, we build a trade and investment openness indicator to classify countries into rapidly and slowly integrating economies.
Rapid and Slow Integrating economies: 1972-1995
Many authors have already done the kind of country classification contemplated here, so one may wonder why we should repeat the exercise again. At least two reasons can be given: first, for internal consistency within the paper; second, because the classic openness indicators have been criticized on several grounds and we will try to correct at least for some of these critiques.
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In subsection 3.1 we build the openness indicator for trade and in subsection 3.2 we focus on international investment flows.
International Trade Openness Indicator
The basic trade openness indicator we are using is the classic ratio of trade to GDP. Thus for country i this is given by:
where TI i is the basic trade openness indicator in country i and GDP i is the Gross Domestic Product of country i.
As one is interested in real effects and not price effects, all these variables are estimated in constant 1987 dollars. This controls for changes in trade to GDP ratios that are merely due to changes in dollar prices. This is of particular importance for countries that trade goods which have a high volatility of prices and countries with high inflation. Similarly, GDP in different countries is estimated in 1987 US prices so that we do not underestimate the GDP of low-price countries. This is done using the World Bank purchasing power parity index.
14 Finally, all 13 An exception is Dollar (1992) which uses as an openess indicator deviations from real exchange rate and then corrects it for the size of the country. variables are again taken as a 5-year moving average from 1976 to 1995 to control for yearspecific exogenous shocks. This allows us to focus on main trends.
We correct the basic trade openness indicator to account for differences in country size and levels of development. Indeed, it has often been argued that large countries in terms of GDP and/or population tend to trade less, as there is larger scope for trade within the country. 15 Similarly, it has been argued that countries with high level of GDP/capita may also be biased toward having a lower level of trade to GDP ratio. 16 The reason is that as countries develop, the share of the service sector tends to increase, and the service sector is largely non-tradable. To account for differences in country size and levels of development, we considered the following regression:
GDP pop GDP pop i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t
where subscript i is for countries and t for time; the squared terms control for possible u-type relationships (this may occur, for example, if as economies get richer the services sector share becomes larger, but also at very high levels of development (high GDP/capita) economies start trading services and therefore the non-tradable sector becomes smaller). Obviously, the regression cannot be run as such due to multicollinearity problems. Also the squared of the population turned out to be insignificant (though it had the correct negative sign). Thus the constrained regression we run in panel (2540 observations) is given by:
As an extreme example, assume a two-country world composed of Uruguay and a second country which represents the rest-of-the world. It is then clear that Uruguay will have a much larger trade to GDP ratio than the rest-of-the-world, as the latter can easily trade a substantial amount of goods internally which will not correspond to international trade under our assumption. 16 See for example IMF (1997), p. 46. 17 We also ran a further constrained regression by putting the GDP that appears on the left hand side (recall that TI includes GDP) on the right hand side. Results were statistically significant at the 99% level and equal to those reported in The coefficients tend to have the expected signs and indicate that trade openness falls with population and that the relationship between openness and GDP and GDP/capita has a u-shape.
That is, for small levels of GDP and GDP/capita, the higher the GDP or the GDP/capita the lower the level of openness. This confirms our predictions. For sufficiently high levels of GDP and GDP/capita, the relationship is reversed. In the case of GDP/capita, this may be explained by the fact that once a country becomes sufficiently rich it also starts to trade services, as argued before. Because of the constraints due to multicollinearity, it is impossible to identify at which levels of GDP and GDP/capita the relationship changes. However, as the coefficient of the squared GDP term is relatively small, we presume that this occurs at relatively high levels of GDP, whereas as the coefficient of the squared GDP/capita term is relatively large, the relationship changes at relatively low levels of GDP/capita.
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In sum, results tend to confirm that larger and poorer countries tend to trade less.
We then construct the fitted value of TI from the above regression, which tells us what is the "normal" degree of openness of a country with a given GDP and GDP/capita. That is: 
Thus, we control for the initial degree of openness by running the above OLS regression across countries (112 observations). The results can be found in table 2.
Insert here table 2
We now build the corrected rate of trade integration indicator by taking the fitted value of the above regression ( RTI i  ) and comparing it with the actual value of RTI i . Thus, the corrected rate of trade integration, denoted by RTI i  is given by:
Thus, when RTI i   1 , country i has been opening more quickly than the average country with the same level of trade openness in 1976. Table 4 reports the ranking of countries according to 
International Investment Openness Indicator
The basic investment openness indicator we are using is the classic ratio of international investment flows to GDP. Thus for country i this is given by:
where II i is the basic investment openness indicator in country i.
To classify countries into fast and slow investment integrating countries we proceed in the same way as for trade integration.
We first control for size and GDP/capita. Results of the constraint regression are given in Table   4 . As for trade openness, the larger the population of a country, the lower its level of investment openness. The relationship between investment openness and GDP and GDP/capita is also ushaped. Thus for low levels of GDP and GDP/capita, the higher GDP or GDP/capita, the lower the level of investment openness, whereas for high levels of GDP and GDP/capita, the relationship is reversed.
Insert here table 4
We then build the corrected investment openness indicator, denoted
, which is given by
where II i t  , is the fitted value of II i t , .
As in the case of trade, we are interested in the evolution through time of the level of investment openness so we build an indicator of the speed of investment integration, denoted RII i , which is given by:
As before, we corrected RII i for the initial condition by running the OLS regression of RII i on
. Results are reported in Table 5 .
Insert here table 5
From there we build the corrected rate of investment integration indicator, RII i  which is given by:
where RII i  is the fitted value of the regression reported in Table 5 . 
Fast and Slow Integrating Economies
In the previous section we classified countries into fast and slow integrating countries. This allows us to decompose our sample into these two categories. In order to capture the idea that domestic policies rather than Globalization itself have been the cause of the decline of some countries in terms of trade and investment shares, we will calculate the different concentration indices presented in section 2 with respect to these two sets of countries. This is confirmed when regressing the six indicators on a time trend as they are all positively and significantly correlated at the 99% level with the time trend (except for L in the case of financial flows, which is negatively and significantly correlated at the 90% level).
Trade and Investment Concentration among fast integrating countries
Insert here figures 10 and 11
A comparison of figures 8 to 11 suggests that if trade and investment flows may be more concentrated at the world level, this may be simply explained by the fact that some countries remain relatively closed and do not participate in the Globalization process. Thus, Globalization does not inherently create marginalization. Rather, countries marginalize themselves.
Concluding Remarks
The aim of this paper was to determine whether trade and financial flows have tended to be We ranked countries into fast and slow-integrating countries and calculated the various concentration indicators for each of these groups of countries. It appears that the concentration of trade and financial flows has fallen among rapidly integrating countries, whereas it has increased among slow-integrating countries. We argue this shows that marginalization of individual countries from world markets can be mostly explained by inward-looking domestic policies and therefore that marginalization is not inherent to the globalization process.
Bibliography
Amjadi, A., U. Reinke and A. Yeats (1996) 
Data Appendix
Trade, GDP and population data is from the World Development Indicators of the World Bank and covers the period from 1972 to 1995. Trade and GDP are provided in 1987 dollars and GDP is calculated in purchasing power parity using World Bank data. International investment data is IFS data from the IMF for the same period. All variables are calculated using a 5 year moving average to avoid year fluctuations. 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
